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Abstract
In this paper, we examine a relatively novel form of gambling, index (or spread) betting, that
mirrors (and indeed overlaps with) practices in conventional financial markets.  In this form
of betting, a number of bookmakers quote a bid-offer spread about the result of some future
event, and bettors are invited to buy (sell) at the top (bottom) end of the quoted spreads.  We
hypothesise that the existence of an outlying spread may provide uninformed traders with
information that can be used to develop improved trading strategies.  Using conditional
moment tests on data from a popular spread betting market in the United Kingdom, we find
that in the presence of a number of price-setters, the market mid-point is indeed a better
predictor of asset values than the outlying price.  We further show that this information can
be used to develop trading strategies that lead to returns that are consistently positive and
superior to those from noise trading and, in some cases, significantly so.
Keywords: Quarbs, market efficiency, betting.
JEL Classification: D82, G12, G14.1
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1. Introduction
For a number of years, researchers have studied market efficiency in betting markets, arguing
that such markets are good proxies for financial markets.  Notably, these markets possess not
only many of the usual attributes of financial markets, specifically a large number of
investors (bettors) with potential access to widely available information sets, but also the
property that each asset (or bet) has a well-defined termination point, characterised by a
definite value.  This contrasts, for example, with financial securities involving options, where
the value of an asset in the present is dependent both on the present value of future cash flows
and also on the uncertain price at which it can be sold at some future point.  Moreover, by
enabling a more productive and clearer learning process, a delineated end-point might be
expected to promote information efficiency.  Evidence of inefficiency in betting markets may
therefore be of special significance.
There is, indeed, an array of evidence to support the contention that fixed-odds and
parimutuel betting markets may be subject to systematic biases.
2  Most notable amongst these
biases are the favourite-longshot bias, which is the observed tendency for the expected return
to bets placed at lower odds to exceed that to bets placed at higher odds, and the ‘hot hand’
effect.  The hot hand effect is a tendency by bettors to overestimate the extent to which a
team or individual’s performance is positively autocorrelated.  However, such work may be
unrepresentative of general financial markets in two key respects.  Firstly, the satisfaction
gained from making the wager itself and/or jointly consuming the associated event is
relatively more significant for the majority of bettors than for financial traders, whose utility
functions are more likely to be dominated by wealth and risk considerations.  Secondly, a
typical wager (either on a lottery or a horse race) involves the bettor risking a fixed, small
proportion of their wealth.  In contrast, many financial decisions involve risking a more
variable and potentially much larger proportion of wealth.
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In this paper, we consider a relatively novel form of wagering, namely ‘Index (or
Spread) Betting’, which much more closely resembles the operation of conventional financial
markets and, indeed, is in some cases indistinguishable from them.  In this sense, we are
echoing the work of Avery and Chevalier (1999), who look at sports betting from a
perspective which has a natural analogue in the stock market.
Spread (Index) Betting originated in the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s, but
developed rapidly in the late 1980s and the 1990s.  It is quite different to point spread betting,
as operated in the US, which is essentially a fixed-odds ‘handicap’ betting system, in which
bettors wager at fixed odds on one team to beat the other after points are artificially deducted
from one of the teams.  In Spread (Index) Betting, bettors instead buy or sell notional assets
associated with an event (for example, points in a football game), based on a bid-offer spread
set by traders (bookmakers).  The bid-offer spread may either increase or decrease until the
value of the asset is known with certainty (at the end of the game).  At this point a bettor who
bought the asset will win or lose the difference between the ex-post value of the asset and the
ask price multiplied by their original stake.  The bettor may ‘close’ the trade at any time up to
the terminal point based on the current bid-offer spread, taking either a loss or a win as
appropriate.
The size of the bid-offer spread involves a trade-off between setting a large spread, so
as to minimise the profit of insider traders (defined as those who possess superior information
to the market-maker) and setting the optimal spread against noise or liquidity traders.  Papers
by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) have provided
formal analyses of this issue and this methodology has been adapted for use in fixed-odds
betting markets by, for example, Shin (1993).  The findings of this body of work reveal that
market prices are indeed set on the basis that there is a significant incidence of insider
activity.  In any case, in an efficient market it should not be possible at quoted prices to make
systematic abnormal returns, based on publicly available information.
The scope of ‘assets’ that are traded in spread betting markets is wide, ranging from
the price of gold to the number of goals in a football match.  Indeed, the ‘asset’ that is the
subject of the trade can include almost any clearly quantifiable feature of an array of sports,
political and financial markets.  There are also some so-called ‘speciality’ indices, for
example the number of ‘Oscars’ won by a given film at the Academy Awards ceremony.
Standard political trades include the number of seats gained by a political party in an election.
Financial trading is exceptionally diverse, and includes the values of the Wall Street, DAX,3
FTSE, Hang Seng and Nikkei share indices, the price of individual shares traded on these
markets, the price of a variety of commodities, as well as bond and currency futures.
3
Spread betting markets are characterised by a low level of transaction costs (at least
relative to traditional betting markets).  Therefore, they are an attractive option both to small
traders, motivated primarily by wealth considerations, and to larger traders using financial
spread betting markets as part of a more general risk management strategy.  In particular,
spread trading is often used to hedge against, for example, a potential short-term fall in the
market.  The low transactions costs also make it possible for potential arbitrageurs to profit
from relatively small mispricings in the market (see, for example, Hurley and McDonough,
1995).  Jackson (1994) and Haigh (1999) have also provided formal probabilistic treatments
of such trading markets.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine efficient pricing within spread betting
markets, notably whether it is possible for rational ‘arbitrageurs’ to exploit mispricing
available in the quoted odds across the market-place.  In this sense, we are seeking to add to
the literature contributed by several authors who have already shown conditions in more
traditional markets where ‘arbitrageurs’ fail to eliminate mispricing.
4  In particular, we
consider the setting of a price by one company that is everywhere outside the mid-point of the
spreads of all market-makers combined.  We term such a price a ‘quasi-arbitrage’ or ‘Quarb’
and ask whether it can provide useful information to bettors.
5
Most previous work on mispricing in sports betting markets has focused on the final
line (see Gandar et al., 1988 for a number of references; see also Woodland and Woodland,
1994, Gray and Gray, 1997).  In this paper, we consider the opening line explicitly and
critically, as well as the line once prices have settled.  In this way we add to work by Gandar
et al. (1988, 1998) and Avery and Chevalier (1999), albeit in a different betting arena.  We
also extend the literature away from the focus on the favourite-longshot bias and the hot-hand
bias.
Using data from the popular spread market in bookings points (corresponding to an
index of fair play) for football matches in the UK, we employ a variety of tests to distinguish
between alternative predictors of asset prices.  We then investigate whether the information
from these tests can be used to develop profitable (or at least improved) trading strategies.
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In the next section of the paper we describe the operation of spread betting markets in
some detail.  In section three, we outline our empirical approach and introduce our data.  In
section four, we report our results, whilst in section five we make some concluding remarks.
2. Spread Betting Markets
The central feature of a spread betting market is the setting by a market-maker (the
bookmaker) of a bid-offer spread for the commodity in question. For example, in a cricket
game between England and Australia, the bookmaker might set spread for runs in England’s
first innings of 240-250.  A bettor who believes England’s batting is weak may sell total runs
at the price of 240 on a stake of, say, £5 per run.  If England score 215 runs, this is the
termination value of the asset and the bettor will win £125, calculated as the difference
between the value and the price (240 - 215) times the stake (£5).  On the other hand, if
England score 290 runs in the game, the bettor would lose £250, calculated as the difference
between 290 and 240 times the £5 stake.  Similarly, the bettor could choose to buy total runs
at a price of 250.  In this case, an England score of 215 would result in a loss of £175 whilst a
score of 290 would result in a win of £200.
There are currently four major Spread Betting companies.  These are Cantor Index (a
subsidiary of Cantor Fitzgerald), IG Index, Sporting City Index and Spreadex.  All of the
companies are based in the UK (but offer trades to customers from overseas) and are
regulated by the UK Financial Services Authority.  Each company may offer a different quote
about the same market.  If the top end of the spread quoted by one company lies below the
bottom end of the spread quoted by another, there is potential for arbitrage, in the sense of a
riskless profit.  Say, for example, Cantor Index offered the spread of 240-250 in the above
game and Sporting Index offered a quote of 229-239.  This is an arbitrage position, since it is
possible to buy points at 239 with Sporting Index and sell points at 240 with Cantor Index,
and win whatever the result.  Much more common than an outright arbitrage, however, is
where the average or mid-point of all the quoted spreads lies outside the top (or bottom) end
of the spread quoted by at least one market-maker.  We call these circumstances a ‘Full
Quarb’ (Vaughan Williams, 2001) and they are the focus of discussion in this paper.
6  The
issue is whether, in the circumstances in which Full Quarbs (henceforth Quarbs) occur, it is
the average market position or the outlying market position which provides most information.
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If the market is assumed to process all known information in the most efficient manner, it
might be expected that the average market position will provide the best predictor of the
actual outcome.  If, on the other hand, one market-maker (or more) possesses privileged
information, or at least has a superior ability to process public information, an outlying
market quote might provide a more accurate predictor.  The outlying position is taken as the
mid-point of the quote offered by the market-maker most out of line with the average market
position.  We seek to ask, firstly, whether either of these positions is systematically superior
as a predictor of the actual outcome and, secondly, whether it is possible to implement a
trading strategy based on this, using publicly available information, in such a way as to earn
returns that are either abnormal or that are superior to those from noise trading.
3. Data and Empirical Approach
3.1 Data
The data that we use to illustrate and test our hypotheses are taken from the market for
‘bookings’ in English Premier League football matches during the 1999/2000 and 2000/2001
seasons.  This market is one of the most heavily traded of all the spread betting markets on
offer.  The asset which is traded is an index of ‘fair play’ based on the number of disciplinary
cards issued by referees to players in any given football match.  It works on the basis of
awarding ten points for each ‘yellow card’ (caution) and 25 for each ‘red card’ (dismissal).
Two cautions in a match earn a player an automatic dismissal from the field of play for the
duration of the match.  35 points is the maximum for any individual player, comprising 10
points for the first yellow card and 25 points for dismissal bought about by the second
caution.  The average bookings points score for games in our data set is in the region of 40.
The width of the spread set by companies in the bookings market varies from three to four.
The outcome is, of course, bounded from below by zero (no cards).  In theory an upper bound
also exists but, in practice, it is never approached.  For example, in our data, the highest
bookings score for a game is 150, well below the theoretical maximum.
Spreads for the bookings market were collected for up to five companies that existed
during this period.  The opening prices are usually announced one or two days before each
game.  These were collected from television text services throughout the two seasons.  Data
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are available on 207 matches for the 1999/2000 season and on 240 matches for the 2000/2001
season.
For the first stage of the analysis, we need to be able to identify an outlying spread.
This means that we require a minimum of three quotes to be available.  Further, the quotes
must not be symmetric about the average.
7  Applying these restrictions, we end up with a
sample of 102 matches for the first stage.  For the second stage, in which we compare returns
on Quarb positions to others, we include all the matches for which we have data.
For each match we calculate the actual bookings score using data on the number of
players booked and sent off taken from the data published by the specialist football magazine,
‘Match’.  We also have available for each game a second set of spread quotes taken once the
market has settled down (denoted as ‘Settled Prices’).  These data are taken from the figures
published by the daily sports newspaper, the Racing Post.
3.2 Empirical Approach
We consider two alternative predictors of the actual value of the asset: (i) the average mid-
point of the market bid-offer spreads (MID); (ii) the mid-point of the outlying bid-offer
spread (OUTLIER).  Our empirical approach is in two stages.  In the first stage we seek to
establish whether either of these two measures is consistently superior as a predictor of the
asset value.  In the second stage, we investigate whether the traders can utilise the
information from stage one to construct a profitable trading strategy.
A natural starting point for the first stage is to posit competing hypotheses about the
determination of the actual value of the asset (in our case bookings points):
H1: Vi = a + b.MIDi + ui (1)
H2: Vi = b + c.OUTLIERi + vi (2)
where Vi is the value of the asset, i (in our case the number of bookings points at the end of
each game) and ui and vi are disturbance terms.
As H2 cannot be written as a restriction of H1, we are choosing between alternative, or
non-nested, models.  A wide literature exists on choosing between such models.  The
simplest approach is to choose the model with the lowest value of a particular model
selection criterion, such as those of Schwarz, Bayes or Akaike.  These criteria all impose a
penalty on the log-likelihood in relation to the number of parameters being estimated.  For
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example, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) can be given by AIC = -2(log likelihood) +
2(k + 1) where k is the number of regressors.  However, although such model selection
criteria can rank the predictors in order of performance, they do not provide a formal test of
whether the preferred predictor is significantly superior.  Formal tests for choosing between
non-nested models include the Cox test (Cox, 1961; 1962) and the J-test (Davidson and
MacKinnon, 1981).  A standard procedure in such tests is to estimate equations (1) and (2)
and obtain the fitted values in each case (V1i and V2i respectively).  The fitted values are then
used to construct more general models as follows:
Vi = a + b.MIDi + d.V2i + mi (1a)
Vi = b + c.OUTLIERi + e.V1i + ni (2a)
A standard t-test that d = 0 provides a valid test in favour of H1, that is the market mid-point
is the better predictor.  Similarly, a test that e = 0 provides a test in favour of H2, that is the
outlier is the better predictor.  If neither H1 nor H2 is rejected by these tests then there is
evidence that neither predictor is significantly superior.
There is a complication in our case in that the dependent variable (the number of
booking points accrued) cannot fall below zero and is, in effect, censored.  Further, the values
of the dependent variables are limited to particular values - 10, 20, 25, 30, 35 etc.  Given the
nature of the data, several estimation procedures suggest themselves.  One possibility is to
use the Tobit model to take account of the censored nature of the dependent variable.  An
alternative approach would be to treat the dependent variable as count data and to use count
regression models to estimate the model.  We report results using both approaches here.
A complication with using these approaches is that standard non-nested tests do not
take into account the censored or count nature of the dependent variable and may be
unreliable.  Consequently, we apply the conditional moment test for omitted variables
suggested by Pagan and Vella (1989) to our models, using the fitted values from the
alternative model as the potentially erroneously omitted variable.
Following Greene (2000), the general form of the conditional moment test is given
by:
C = I’M[M’M - M’G(G’G)
-1-G’M]
-1M’I (3)
where M is a matrix in which the rows are the terms of the moment conditions; G is a matrix
in which the rows are the terms in the gradient of the log-likelihood function; I is the identity
matrix.8
We now consider the implied moment condition for model (1).  If the variable V2i has
been correctly omitted from model (1), this implies the following expectation for uncensored
(non-limit) observations:
E[V2.(V - a - b.MID)] = 0 (4)
The sample counterpart to this moment restriction is
mi = 1/n [S(V2i.ui) where ui = Vi - a - b.MIDi] (5)
and (in the case of the Tobit model), the sample counterpart for limit observations is
mi = V2i( - s.li) (6)
where s is the standard error of the Tobit regression and li = f(b.MIDi/s)/[1 - j(b.MIDi/s)]
and where f is the standard normal probability density function and j is the standard normal
cumulative density function.
As we are considering only the omitted variable moment condition, M is a single
column vector, the elements of which are given by mi.  On the null hypothesis that the
variable has been validly omitted, the test statistic, C, follows a chi-squared distribution with
one degree of freedom.  A similar argument holds for testing model (2).
Assuming that one predictor is found to be systematically superior, the second stage
of our analysis aims to determine whether or not this information can be used to construct a
profitable trading strategy.  Our approach is to calculate the returns that would have been
made by a trading strategy based on the superior predictor as revealed by stage one.  We then
use standard t-tests to test for the existence of abnormal returns and for returns that are
superior to those from noise trading.  In the first case, we test the null hypothesis that the
returns based on this strategy are equal to zero against the alternative that they are positive.
Second, we test the null hypothesis that the returns are equal to the returns from all other bets
against the alternative that they are greater.  To guard against accusations of data mining, we
repeat the tests out of sample using a set of data reserved from the Stage 1 analysis.
4. Results
Stage 1
In Table 1, we report the Tobit regression estimates of models (1) and (2) using the mean
mid-point as our measure of average.  For both models, the predicting variable is positive and
strongly significant, but the lower value of the AIC suggest that the market mid-point (model
(1)) performs better than the outlier (model (2)).  This is confirmed by the estimates of
equations (1a) and (2a).  The fitted values from model (2) are only weakly significant in9
equation (1a) and attract a negative sign.  The fitted values from model (1), on the other hand,
are strongly significant in equation (2a) and render the main predictor insignificant.  In other
words, applying the standard J-test to our models provides significant evidence in favour of
model 1 and against model 2.  Lastly, using the conditional moments test to take account of
the truncated nature of our dependent variable, we are unable to reject H1 (that model 1 is the
correct specification) at any conventional significance level, whereas we reject H2 (that
model 2 is correct), albeit only at the 10% level.
Using the median value as the market average (reported in Table 2), the results are
even clearer.  The Tobit regression results are fairly close to those using the mean value, but,
in this case, the conditional moments tests suggest rejection of the H2 at the 5% level, whilst
still suggesting that H1 cannot be rejected.
The count regression results are not reported here, but have exactly the same pattern
as the Tobit regressions.  Taken together, the evidence appears to be conclusive in suggesting
that the market mid-point is systematically superior to the outlier in predicting actual asset
values.  An obvious question that arises here is whether there exist systematic differences in
the performance of outliers between the firms.  For example, it may be that one firm has
superior information in this market and that outlying prices quoted by this firm will tend to be
better predictors than outlying prices quoted by others.  To test this hypothesis, we modify
model (1) and (2) by allowing the slope variables to take different values for each of the five
companies in our sample (not reported here).  For each of the regression models, we find no
significant differences between the companies, implying that there is no evidence that the
performance of any of the firms was systematically superior to the others in our sample.
Stage 2
We now examine whether the information gained from Stage 1, can be used to devise a
profitable trading strategy.  Specifically, we examine the returns to trading against the subset
of outliers in which a Quarb exists, that is, where the market mid-point lies entirely outside
the outlying spread.  The logic behind this strategy is that, in the absence of other
information, the mid-point of all spreads provides us with an obvious point estimate of the
expected value of the asset.  On this basis, we can expect positive returns as long as this value
is greater (less) than the price at which we buy (sell).  For example, if the mean mid-point of
all spreads in the market is 35.5 and the outlying spread is 36-39, the strategy would be to sell10
bookings with the outlying company at 36.  If the outlying spread is 32-35, the strategy would
be to buy bookings at 35.  An outlying spread of 35-38 would imply no trade.
Note that when a true arbitrage position exists, the Quarb strategy may suggest a buy
and a sell bet at the same time.  Our strategy is based on opposing the outliers so, in these
cases, only one trade is allowed, using the quote furthest from the mid-point.  For example, if
there are three quotes of 24-28, 26-30 and 29-33, the mean mid-point is 28.3.  The outlying
quote (furthest from the mean) is 29-33 and the strategy would be to sell at 29.
In Table 3, we report the mean return to all bets and returns to trades based on the
Quarb strategy for the ‘within sample’ data on which we conducted our Stage 1 tests - the
1999/2000 season.  To avoid charges of data mining in a search for profitable trading
opportunities, in Table 4, we report returns using the reserved sample, namely matches with
available data for the 2000/2001 season.
For each game there are two possible bets: buy bookings and sell bookings.  In the
1999/2000 season (‘within sample’) this means there are 414 bets in total.  The mean return
to a unit £1 stake on every possible bet was £0.077 (standard error 1.349).  Of these bets, the
Quarb strategy suggests 60 trades.  The mean return to the Quarb trades is £9.817 (standard
error 3.660).  Given the nature of spread betting it is difficult to present this as a rate of
return.  However, on the basis of £1 being placed on each Quarb trade, a bettor would have
won £973 on 36 winning bets and lost £384 on 22 losing bets, a net profit of £589 over the
season.  The remaining two bets yielded a return of zero.
We conduct two different t-tests on these returns.  The first is a test of the null
hypothesis that the mean return to Quarb trades is zero against the one-sided alternative that it
is positive.  The second test is of the null hypothesis that the mean return to Quarb trades is
equal to the mean return to all other bets against the one-sided alternative that the Quarb
mean return is greater.  For the 1999/2000 season, both the t-tests suggest rejection of the null
at the 1% significance level.  In other words, there is evidence of significantly abnormal and
superior returns in this sample of data.
Using the 2000/2001 season (reported in Table 4), the mean return to a unit stake on
all bets is -£0.202 (standard error 1.024).  With this sample, there are 80 trades suggested by
the Quarb strategy.  The mean return to these bets is lower than in 1999/2000 at £4.825
(standard error 2.152).  However, the mean is significantly greater than zero at the 5% level
and greater than the mean return to other bets at the 1% level, suggesting the Quarb strategy
would have led to superior returns even in the reserved sample.  In this season, a £1 stake on11
each Quarb bet would have yielded winnings of £836 on 50 winning bets and losses of £450
on 28 losing bets, a net profit of £386.
Robustness Check 1: are these prices available?
We have calculated returns to Quarb trades using the opening prices - the initial prices quoted
by bookmakers prior to trading.  These include some prices that represent one side of a true
arbitrage position.  A natural question is whether the quoted prices are actually available to
bettors.  The authors’ experience in these markets suggests that, in general, the published
prices are available, but, particularly when they are part of an arbitrage position, prices often
move within a few minutes of the opening of the market.  Further, bookmakers sometimes
limit stakes in the case of prices that are one side an arbitrage position.  Consequently, in
Tables 3 and 4, we also report returns excluding all games in which the opening prices
represent a true arbitrage.  This restricts the sample size considerably, to just 19 trades in the
‘within sample’ (Table 3).  The small sample size, along with the fact that all returns are not
normally distributed, means that we cannot appeal to the Central Limit Theorem for our t-
tests.  However, the mean returns to Quarb bets are still positive and superior to returns to
other bets.  For the reserved sample (Table 4), 32 bets remain, suggesting that the t-tests are
valid.  The mean return to Quarb bets in this sample is 5.625 (standard error 3.418) and the t-
tests suggest evidence in favour of abnormal returns at the 10% significance level and in
favour of superior returns at the 5% level.
An alternative approach is to examine the returns to the Quarb bets, based on the
settled prices.  As explained above, these are published some time after the market has settled
down and almost always represent prices that are available in practice.  Returns to the Quarb
trades suggested by the opening prices, but evaluated at these settled prices, are given in the
third column of Tables 3 and 4.  For the ‘within sample’, returns to Quarb bets are lower than
at opening prices, but still significantly positive and significantly superior to other bets, both
at the 5% level.  For the ‘reserved sample’ the returns are positive and superior in each case,
although significance levels are lower than for the ‘within sample’.
Robustness Check 2: controlling for risk
The role of risk in these markets is not the primary focus of this paper, but it might
reasonably be asked whether the positive returns to Quarb trades can be explained by risk.
The two types of bets contained within this spread betting market (buy and sell) represent12
directly contrasting risk positions.  For example, given a spread of 36-40, a bettor who sells
bookings at 36 with a stake of £1 knows with certainty that winnings cannot exceed £36.  The
maximum loss, is unknown, however, and (effectively) open-ended.  On the other hand a
bettor who buys at 40 knows with certainty that the maximum loss will be £40 but the
winnings are open ended.  In this limited sense, we can say that sell bets are riskier
propositions to bettors than buy bets.  Consequently, sell bets may attract a risk premium.  If
sell bets are over-represented in the sample of Quarb bets, then this may go some way to
explaining our finding of abnormal returns.
We control for differential risk by separating out returns to sell and buy bets and then
testing whether the returns to sell (buy) bets involving Quarbs are significantly greater than
the returns to all other sell (buy) bets.  The separate returns ‘within sample’ are reported in
Table 5 and for the ‘reserved sample’ in Table 6.  There is indeed some evidence of a risk
premium to sell bets.  The mean return to all Quarb sell bets in the reserved sample is 2.879
points (standard error 2.034), whereas the mean return to buy bets is -6.285 points (standard
error 1.965).  There is also a premium in the ‘reserved sample’, although of a lower
magnitude.  However, in both samples, the returns to Quarb bets are superior than to others
for both buy and sell bets.  In the ‘within sample’, the Quarb sell bets are significantly
superior to the other sell bets at the 1% level, whilst the Quarb buy bets are significantly
superior at the 10% level.  In the ‘reserved sample’ both types of Quarb bets are superior at
the 10% level.  When we estimate the returns using the settled prices, the Quarb returns are
still higher for both types of bets, but the level of significance is reduced.  Eliminating all
games in which the opening prices suggest a true arbitrage leads to very small sample sizes
for each of the buy and sell bets.  However, even in this case, the Quarb returns (not reported
here) are superior for both types of bet and in both samples.
In summary, both within and out of sample, there is evidence that bettors can take
advantage in practice of the superior performance of the market mid-point as a predictor to
earn positive and superior returns based on published prices.  Even having controlled for
differential risk, there is still considerable evidence that trading on the basis of Quarbs allows
bettors to make positive returns.
 5. Conclusions
In this study, we have examined the scope for earning superior returns on the basis of simply
defined trading rules in a rapidly growing sector of the betting market, known as index (or13
spread) betting.  In this form of betting, bookmakers quote a bid-offer spread about the result
of some future event, and bettors are invited to buy (sell) at the top (bottom) end of the
spread.  The particular market examined, chosen for its relative popularity and high profile, is
based on the number of disciplinary points awarded in identified football matches in the UK
(the ‘bookings market’).
The results of our study suggest that the mid-point of all quotes is a better forecast of
the actual outcome in the bookings market than is the mid-point of the spread offered by the
market outlier.  This casts doubt on a hypothesis that market-makers who set quotes out of
line with the prevailing view do so because they possess better (even privileged) information,
or that they are able to process a given set of information more effectively than the market as
a whole.
Using the notion of quasi-arbitrages or Quarbs, we find that it is possible to devise a
trading strategy on the basis of the outlying spread that yields returns, both within and out of
sample, that are consistently positive and superior to those that might be expected from noise
trading.  Further, this result is robust to a variety of checks to control for the possibility that
published prices might not be available, and also for the impact of differential risk.14
References
Avery, C. and Chevalier, J. (1999), ‘Identifying Investor Sentiment from Price Paths: the case
of football betting’, Journal of Business, 72 (4), 493-521.
Brown, W.O. and Sauer, R.D. (1993), ‘Does the Basketball Market Believe in the Hot Hand?
Comment’, American Economic Review, 83 (Dec.), 1377-86.
Cain, M., Law, D. and Peel, D. (2000), ‘The Favourite-Longshot Bias and Market Efficiency
in UK Football Betting’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 47 (1), 25-36.
Camerer, C. (1989), ‘Does the Basketball Market Believe in the “Hot Hand”?’, American
Economic Review, 79, 1257-61.
Copeland, T. and Galai, D. (1983), ‘Information Effects on the Bid Ask Spread’, Journal of
Finance, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 1457-1469.
Cox, D. (1961), ‘Tests of Separate Families of Hypotheses’, Proceedings of the Fourth
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, 1, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Cox, D. (1962) ‘Further Results on Tests of Separate Families of Hypotheses’, Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 24, 406-24.
Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. (1981), ‘Several Tests for Model Specification in the
Presence of Alternative Hypotheses’, Econometrica, 49, 781-93.
De Long, J.B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L.H. and Waldmann, R.J. (1990), ‘Noise Trader Risk
in Financial Markets’, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (August), 703-38.
De Long, J.B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L.H. and Waldmann, R.J. (1991), ‘Survival of Noise
Traders in Financial Markets’, Journal of Business, 64 (Jan.), 1-20.
Gandar, J.M., Zuber, R.A., O’Brien, T and Russo, B. (1988), ‘Testing Rationality in the Point
Spread Betting Market’, Journal of Finance, 43 (Sept.), 995-1008.
Gandar, J.M., Dare, W.H., Brown, C.R. and Zuber, R.A. (1998), ‘Informed Traders and Price
Variations in the Betting Market for Professional Basketball Games’, Journal of
Finance, 53 (Feb.), 385-401.
Glosten, L. and Milgrom, P. (1985), ‘Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders’, Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 71-
100.
Golec, J. and Tamarkin, M. (1998), ‘Bettors Love Skewness, Not Risk, at the Horse Track’,
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1 (March), 205-25.15
Gray, P.K. and Gray, S.F. (1997), ‘Testing Market Efficiency. Evidence from the NFL Sports
Betting Market’, Journal of Finance, 52 (Sept.), 1725-37.
Greene, W.H. (2000), Econometric Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Haigh, J. (1999), ‘(Performance) Index Betting and Fixed Odds’, The Statistician, 48, 3, 425-
434.
Hurley, W. and McDonough, L. (1995), ‘A Note on the Hayek Hypothesis and the Favorite-
Longshot Bias in Parimutuel Betting’, American Economic Review, 85, 949-55.
Jackson, D.A. (1994), ‘Focus on Sport: Index Betting on Sports’, The Statistician, 43, 2, 309-
315.
Kyle, A. (1985), ‘Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading’, Econometrica, 53, 1315-1335.
Pagan, A. and Vella, A.F. (1989), ‘Diagnostic Tests for Models Based on Individual Data: a
survey’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4 (supplement), S29-S59.
Paton, D, Vaughan Williams, L and Siegel, D (2002), ‘A Policy Response to the E-
Commerce Revolution: the case of betting taxation in the UK’, Economic Journal,
forthcoming.
Sauer R.D. (1998), ‘The Economics of Wagering Markets’, Journal of Economic Literature,
36, 2021-64.
Schnytzer, A. and Y. Shilony (1995), ‘Inside Information in a Betting Market’, Economic
Journal, 105, 963-71.
Shin H.S. (1993), ‘Measuring the Incidence of Insider Trading in a Market for State-
Contingent Claims’, Economic Journal, 103, 1141-1153.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), ‘The Limits of Arbitrage’, Journal of Finance, 52
(March), 35-55.
Thaler R. and Ziemba W. (1988), ‘Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and Lotteries’
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2, 161-74
Vaughan Williams, L. and Paton, D. (1997), ‘Why is There a Favourite-Longshot Bias in
British Racetrack Betting Markets?’, Economic Journal, 107, 150-158.
Vaughan Williams, L. (2001), ‘Can Bettors Win?  A Perspective on the Economics of Betting’,
World Economics, January, 2 (1), 31- 48.
Woodland, L.M. and Woodland, B.M. (1994), ‘Market Efficiency and the Favorite-Longshot
Bias: the baseball betting market’, Journal of Finance, 49 (March), 269-79.16
Table 1: Tobit Regression Estimates of Bookings Points: mid-points against outliers
(means)
1 2 3 4





















N: uncensored 90 90 90 90
N: censored 12 12 12 12
Log-likelihood -446.88 -445.36 -452.42 -445.36
AIC 899.6 898.72 910.84 898.72
Conditional Moments Test 0.453 2.787*
Conclusion Do not reject H1 Reject H2 at 10% level
Notes:
(i) The dependent variable in each case is the number of bookings points as described in the text.
(ii) Figures in brackets are standard errors.
(iii) *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.
(iv) The conditional moments test is based on that of Pagan-Vella for omitted variables and distinguishes
between the two, non-nested models.  See the text for more details.17
Table 2: Tobit Regression Estimates of Bookings Points: mid-points against outliers
(medians)
1 2 3 4





















N: uncensored 90 90 90 90
N: censored 12 12 12 12
Log-likelihood -445.98 -445.44 -452.42 -445.44
AIC 897.96 898.88 910.84 898.88
Conditional Moments Test 0.273 4.605**
Conclusion Do not reject H1 Reject H2 at 5% level
Notes:
See Table 1.18
Table 3: Tests for Abnormal/Superior Returns 1999/2000 Season (Within Sample)
1 2 3
All Quarbs Excluding Arb
Positions
Settled Prices
Number of bets 414 282 408






Number of Quarbs 60 19 59







Abnormal Returns 2.682*** - 1.824**
Superior Returns 2.897*** - 2.189**
Notes:
(i) Opening prices are those announced at the start of the market.  Settled prices are those published in the
Racing Post on the day of the game in question.  In each case, returns are calculated to the most favourable
price.
(ii) Figures in brackets are standard errors.
(iii) The t-tests for abnormal returns are 1-tailed tests of the hypothesis that the mean return to Quarb bets = 0
against the alternative that the mean > 0.  The tests for superior returns are 1-tailed tests of the hypothesis that
the mean return to Quarb bets = the mean return to other bets against the alternative that the Quarb mean is
greater.  The t-tests for superior returns allow for unequal variances across samples.  Tests are not performed if
the sample size is less than 20.
(iv) *** indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level.





Number of bets 480 362 470






Number of Quarbs 80 32 80







Abnormal Returns 2.242** 1.646* 1.131
Superior Returns 2.474*** 1.930** 1.157
Notes:
See Table 3.19
Table 5: Tests for Risk-Adjusted Abnormal/Superior Returns 1999/2000 Season
(Within Sample)
1 2 3 4
Opening Prices Settled Prices
Sell Bets Buy Bets Sell Bets Buy Bets
Number of bets 207 207 204 204








Number of Quarbs 25 35 24 35









Abnormal Returns 6.219*** 0.491 3.670*** -0.089
Superior Returns 4.471*** 1.523* 4.319*** 0.997
Notes:
See Table 3.
Table 6: Tests for Risk-Adjusted Abnormal/Superior Returns 2000/2001 Season (Out of
Sample)
1 2 3 4
Opening Prices Settled Prices
Sell Bets Buy Bets Sell Bets Buy Bets
Number of bets 240 240 235 235








Number of Quarbs 53 27 53 27









Abnormal Returns 2.572** 0.525 1.618* -0.077
Superior Returns 1.438* 1.345* 0.599 0.632
Notes:
See Table 3.